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NOTES AND COMMENT
court held in this case that the plaintiff was- in the class of a "fre-
quenter" and therefore the defendent owed her the duty of safe main-
tenance imposed upon it by 101.06. Needless to say a hallway that is
so improperly lighted that a person cannot see a stairway at the end
of it is not being maintained in a safe condition. So defendant's first
contention is disposed of to his disadvantage.,
We now consider the question of plaintiffs' contributory negligence.
The court did not waste any time in disposing of this contention. It
followed the rule that it had previously laid down in 204 N. W. 250,
providing flatly that proceeding down an unlighted starway in a pub-
lic building does not constitute contributory negligence, but merely an
assumption of risk that is not a defense. It follows therefore niat pro-
ceeding down a dimly lighted hall does not constitute contributory
negligence.
Defendant further contended that the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior does not apply where, as here, the 'superior' is a charitable organ-
ization. Under the general law of the land, defendant"s contention is
correct. Innumerable cases hold that a religious corporation is a char-
itable organization, 125 N. E. 13; 123 N. E. 289; 209 S. W. 104; 264
Penn., 77. The courts also agree that a charitable organization is not
liable for personal injuries caused by the negligence of its servants or
agents, 119 N. E. 686; 191 N. W. 751 Wis. 178; and 88 S. E. 649
holds that the rule excepting charitable institutions from liability for
torts of their agents or servants is an exception to the rule of respond-
ent superior. So far the general law favors the defendant, but again
the court applies the "Safe Statute" to completely blast his argu-
ments. The court points out that 101.01 (12) and 101.06 (supra)
apply to all public buildings alike, be they owned by charitable organ-
izations or not; and the former as well as the latter must maintain
their public buildings in a safe condition or respond in damages ta
those injured due to the organization's failure to so maintain them.
Thus the Wisconsin "Safe Statute" imposes upon charitable or-
ganizations an obligation which they never before had-that of the
safe maintenance of their public buildings.
FRED J. GRAHAM.
Negligence:
Plaintiff, while in the act of leaving defendant's store after making
a few purchases, slipped and fell in one of the aisles and broke her
arm. Plaintiff seeks recovery on the mere relationship of invitor and
invitee, alleging negligence on the part of the invitor or his employees
solely on the existence of the alleged spot on the floor. HELD.-The
store owner is merely under the duty of exercising reasonable care to
keep the store in safe condition for the customers. F. W. Woolworth
Co. v. Williams, 41 Fed. Rep. 970.
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The defendant is not liable unless negligence is presumed from the
attending facts and circumstances or proven.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which permits an inference
of negligence from the mere proof of an injury or accident, where
it appears that the injury or accident would not or could not have
happened except for the negligent conduct of the defendant, the plain-
tiff makes a case for the jury by proof of the accident or injury. Rost
v. Roberts 180 Wis. 207 192 N. W. 38). The mere fact that the plain-
tiff was injured while lawfully on the premises of the defendant does
not raise a presumption of negligence on the part of the latter. Stearns
v. Ontario Spinning Co. 184 Pa. 519 39 A. 292 39 L. R. A. 842 63 Am.
St. Rep. 807, Huey v. Gahlenbeck 121 Pa. 238 15 A. 5520 6 Am. St.
Rep. 790, Spickernagle v. Woolworth 236 Pa. 496 84 A. 909 Ann. Cas.
1914A 132, Diver v. Singer Mfg. Co. 205 Pa. 170 54 A. 718). The
burden therefore rested on the plaintiff to show some specific act of
negligence. It must appear that the condition which produced the fall
had either been in fact brought to the previous notice of the defendant,
or failing in proof of said actual notice, that the condition had existed
for such a space of time as would have afforded the defendant suffi-
cient opportunity to make proper inspection as to the safety of the
place. (Rom v. Huber reported in 94 N. J. Law. 258 109 A. 504,
affirming the same case in 93 N. J. Law. 360 108 A. 361). in the case
under review there is no evidence to show that the spot was placed
on the floor by the defendant or any of its servants, or that the defend-
ant or his servants knew of its presence. Hence the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur is not applicable, and the negligence of the defendant can-
not be presumed from the attending facts or circumstances.
A customer who enters a store for the purpose of trade occupies
the status of an invitee, and in this connection it is not necessary that
the person entering should have a definite purpose of making any par-
ticular purchase, but it is sufficient that he enters to look around with
the purpose of buying anything which he may see which strikes his
fancy or with a view of dealing with the store at some other time.
(45 C. J. 816-17 PP 223, Kaufman Dep. Stores Inc. v. Cranston 258
Fed. 917 169 CCA 637, Kresge Co. v. Fader 116 St. 718 158 N. E.
174, Spahn v. F. W. Woolworth Co. 22 Pa. Dist, 874). The relation-
ship then that existed between plaintiff and defendant was that of in-
vitee and invitor. While the owner, occupant, or person in charge of
the property is not an insurer of the safety of the licencee thereon,
he owes to the invitee the duty of a reasonable or ordinary care for
his safety (Ten Broeck v. Wells 47 Fed. 690, Campbell v. Sutliff 193
Wis. 370 N. W. 374). What is more the invitor owes to the invitee
the duty of keeping the premises in a reasonably safe and suitable
condition, so that the invitee shall not be unnecessarily or unreason-
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ably exposed to danger. (Sweeny v. Colony etc. R. Co., 10 Allen
(Mass.) 368 87 Am. D. 664, Morgan v. Budlong, 162 Wis. 578 156
N. W. 958). The plaintiff then has the duty to prove that the defend-
ant was guilty of ordinary negligence, in order to recover. Tie plain-
tiff relied entirely on the existence of the spot on the floor. It is not
sufficient for plaintiff to show the oil was there; she must go further,
and show its presence under circumstances sufficient to charge defend-
ant with responsibility therefor (Mond v. Erion 223 App. Div. 526
228 N. Y. S. 533 35). Hence the plaintiff can not recover. The court
has again gone on record to the effect that the defendant is not an
insurer against accident to persons entering its store for the purpose
of making purchases or otherwise.
CHARLES R IEDL
Rights of Adjoining Landowners.
Schaefer v. Hoffman, 198 Wis. 233, was an action to recover dam-
ages caused by the collapse of plaintiff's garage, due to excavation
on an adjoining lot owned by the defendant. Both parties were in-
formed on their rights and duties as adjoining landowners, and ac-
cordingly, the defendant gave plaintiff notice of his intention to ex-
cavate, and plaintiff thereupon employed one Stoltz, a contractor, to
protect his building. Defendant contractor assured plaintiff that there
was no need to .worry, and that he would care for plaintiff's interest
excavation, and as a result was not on hand to protect plaintiff's
if anything should happen. Stoltz was out of the city at the time of
building. Defendant's contractor, also defendant in this case, started
excavation, and in the course of the work, dug below the bottom of
plaintib's foundation causing the garage to collapse. The court below
changed the jury's answer to the special verdict to read that the de-
fendant contractor was not guilty of want of ordinary care in excavat-
ing. Upon appeal by the plaintiff the supreme court held that plaintiff
could not recover.
The party excavating is legally bound to protect the adjoining lot
in its natural condition from damages resulting from removal of lat-
eral support. This is an absolute duty (Hickman v. Wellauer, 169-
Wis. 18), and is a duty that defendant cannot delegate, since defend-
ant cannot avoid liability for failure to so protect land in its natural
condition by entering into a contract with an independent contractor
for performance of work (Wahl v. Kelly, 94 Wis. 539.)
However, where the adjoining land is burdened with the weight of
an artificial structure, such additional weight of an artificial structure,
such additional weight must be cared for by the owner of the land
on which the structure is located, provided the adjoining owner gives
timely notice of his intention to excavate. Thus in Schaffer v. Hoff-
